Abstract. We study the structure of nonmonotonic access policies for internet-based resources. We argue that such policies could be divided into two parts: the locally designed policies and imported policies. Imported policies should always be monotonic while the local policies could be nonmonotonic. We develop a safe proof procedure for nonmonotonic trust negotiation where safety means that access to a resource is granted only if its access policy is satisfied.
Introduction
Blaze, Feigenbaum and Lacy [1] introduced trust management (TM) as a new approach to decentralized authorization. An access decision in TM is based on two sources of information obtained from the credentials submitted by the clients and from local databases of collected credentials and observations. An example is an access policy of an auction site stating that a client with a valid digital credit card and no record of cheating is allowed to participate in its auction service. Such rule could be represented using Horn clauses as follows:
Believe(S,TrustWorthy(Auction),C) ← Believe(S,HaveFund,C), not Believe(S,Fraudster,C)
stating that server S believes that client C is trustworthy for access to the auction if S believes that C has sufficient fund and S has no evidence to believe that C is a fraudster where a valid credit card is a convincing proof for S that the client has sufficient fund. It has been recognized in the literature that one of the key requirements for TM access policies is that it should be monotonic with respect to the client's submitted credentials but could be nonmonotonic with respect to the site's local information about the client [12] . This requirement is designed to avoid situations in which the client has been given access to some services, but later when he submits new credentials for other services, and the disclosure of the new credentials may terminate the access to those services granted to him before. The question of what kind of structure access policies should have to satisfy this requirement is still open.
A key aspect in TM is delegation. Delegation allows a principal to transfer authority over some resources to other principals. Delegation hence divides a principal's access policies into two parts: The principal's own policies and other components that are imported. Consider for example the policies of a book store that offered discount to its preferred customer [10] . Students from a nearby university U are its preferred customers. The book store policy also states that any preferred customer of an E-organization is also its preferred customer. The access policy hence consists of two parts: the book store local regulation that directly identifies who gets discount, and the imported regulation of the E-organization about its preferred customers.
Imported policies are rules to determine the beliefs of those who issued them. Therefore imported policies should be monotonic as otherwise, to evaluate them, an agent would need to have access to the entire information base (often including sensitive information) of the issuers of such policies. However in practice, agents are unlikely to let other agents having access to their sensitive local information. Hence, it is natural to expect imported policies to be monotonic.
Herzberg et all [6] has discussed nomonotonicity for access policies without imported rules. The monotonicity with respect to the client submitted credentials was not discussed in [6] . Though a proof procedure for nonmonotonic access policies has been given in [6] , it is not clear what kind of declarative semantics this procedure has and especially how it is related to the semantics of nonmonotonic reasoning.
Trust negotiation is a process of exchanging certificates and policy statements that allows one party to establish sufficient trust on the other party to allow it access to some resource.
Logic programming has been shown to be an appropriate framework for studying trust management [10] . It is also well-known that the mechanism of negation as failure in logic programming provides a powerful tool for nonmonotonic reasoning [4, 5] .
In this paper we study the structure of nonmonotonic access policies and develop a procedure for trust negotiation with nonmonotonic access policies. Our procedure is based on the sldnf procedure in logic programming. We then show that the proposed procedure produces safe negotiation in the sense that access to a resource is granted only if its access policy is satisfied. Let P be a logic program and G be the set of all the ground instances of clauses in P. A stable model of P is defined as a set of ground atoms M such that M is the least Herbrand model of P M where P M is obtained from G as follows:
Delete every clause C from G whose body contains a negative literal notA such that A ∈ M Delete all negative literals from the remaining clauses We write P |= A for a ground atom A if A belongs to all stable models of P. More about semantics of logic programs could be found in [4, 5] 3 Structure of Nonmonotonic Access Policies
We assume an alphabet consisting of the following components:
-A set R of role (also called attribute) names -A set of principal identifiers PI -A set RE of resource identifiers.
-A distinct unary attribute symbol Trustworthy (often abbreviated as TW) -A ternary predicate Bel(x,R,y) stating that x believes that y has attribute R. -A binary predicate symbol Hold(R,x) stating that x has attribute R.
.
A principal term is either a principal identifier from PI or a PI-variable where a PI-variable is a variable that could be instantiated with values from PI only.
A certificate is of the form Cert(A,R,B) where A,B are principal identifiers from PI and R is an attribute term. The purpose of a certificate is to certify that A believes that B has the attribute R. In practice, certificates have more complex structures. We restrict ourself on a simple form of certificates as we are focused on the study of nonmonotonic access policies. Certificates represent an important kind of resources that are different from those resources represented by resource identifiers from RE. We define a resource term either as a resource identifier, or a certificate.
A attribute term has the form R(t 1 , . . . , t n ) where R is an n-ary attribute symbol from R and t 1 , . . . , t n are resource terms.
An atom is either of the form Bel(p,T,q) or Hold(T,p) where p,q are principal terms and T is an attribute term. q is called the subject of the atom while p is its issuer. A literal is an atom or the negation of an atom. The subject or issuer of a literal is the subject or issuer of its atom respectively.
Let S be a set of belief atoms and x,y be two principal terms appearing in some atoms in S. We say that there is a flow of trust from x to y in S if there are principal terms p 1 , . . . , p m and attribute terms
A policy clause of a principal A is of the form:
where A is a principal identifier, p is a principal term, T is a attribute term and α 1 , . . . , α n+k are atoms such that every variable except p appears as the subject of some positive literal in the body of the clause. The intuition behind this condition is that there is a flow of trust from some well-known principals, represented as principal identifiers in the clause, to any principal that could possibly appear in A's policy. A is called the issuer of the clause. A principal term p is said to be redundant in a policy clause if there exists no flow of trust from p to the subject of the head of the clause in the set of positive literals of the clause body. A policy clause is said to be nonredundant if there is no redundant principal terms in its body.
It is not difficult to see that credentials defined in the languages RT 0 , RT 1 , RT 2 in the RT family [10] could be represented either as a certificate or as a policy clause in our framework.
An access policy of an principal A is defined as a a pair AP L = (LP L, IP L) where -LPL is a finite set of local nonredundant policy clauses of A.
-IPL is a finite set of imported nonredundant policy clauses whose issuers are not A.
Consider the access policies of the book store (BS) example in the introduction. The policy clauses of BS are the following:
while the imported clauses are those determining who are the preferred customers of EOrg.
The attribute dependency graph of a access policy P is a directed graph whose nodes are the attributes appearing in P, and there is a positive (resp. negative) edge from α to β if α appears in the head of a clause in P and β appears in positive (resp. negative) literal in its body.
A path in the attribute dependency graph of P is said to be positive (resp negative) if all (resp. some) edges on this path are positive (resp. negative). Now we can define formally the notion of a trust management system. From definition 1, it follows immediately that there is no path linking an attribute that appears in a negative literal in the body of some clause of AP L to an attribute in CA in the attribute dependency graph of AP L. This condition guarantees that when a server checks a negative condition, it does not require the client to send extra information. 
AP L ∪ DBO ∪ T h |= Bel(A, T rustW orthy(R), C) where T h = {Bel(B, S, D) | Cert(B, S, D) ∈ DBC ∪ SC}
The monotonicity with respect to the client submitted credentials is stated in the theorem below Theorem 1. Let A = AP L, DBO, DBC, CA be a TMS of A, C be principal identifiers, SC be a guarantee for C to get access to R wrt A and SC be a set of credentials of the form Cert(B,T,C) with T ∈ CA such that SC ⊆ SC . Then SC' is also a guarantee for C to get access to R wrt A.
It is not difficult to see that for each atom α ∈ M \ M , there is a positive path from the attribute of α to an attribute of a certificate in SC 0 in the attribute dependency graph of APL. From the structure of trust management system (definition 1), it follows that α does not appear as a ground instance of a negative literals in any of the policy clauses. Hence P M = P M . Hence M is a stable model of P. From the assumption that SC be a guarantee for C to get access to R wrt A, it follows immmediately Bel(A, T W (R), C) ∈ M . The theorem is proved.
Trust Negotiation With Nonmonotonic Access Policies
When a principal A wants to access a resource R controlled by B, A sends a request to B. B will consult its local policy to check whether A is trustworthy enough to be given access to R. During this process, B may ask A to send over some certificates to certify certain attributes of A. If the checking process is successful, B will send A a message informing it that its request for access to R has been granted. On the other hand, when A gets requests from B for A's certificates, A consults its own local policy to check whether B should be given access to the requested certificates. A may ask B to send over some certificates before sending B the requested certificates. An example is a scenario in which a client of a E-business orders some good. The business may ask the client for a credit card. Before sending the credit card to the business, the client may ask for a Better Business Bureau certificate from the business. In the following, we will model these processes.
There are many possible strategies on how trust negotiation could be conducted. Consider an example of a policy governing access to sensitive documents of a top secret project where only members of partner projects are allowed to access the documents.
Bel(S, T rustW orthy, x) ← Hold(P artner, y), Bel(y, M ember, x),
An agent could work on many projects and is reluctant on its part to disclose its associations to these projects.
When getting a access request, S could reveal the partner projects and asks the client to prove its association to one of them. This would reveal sensitive information about identity of the partner projects and hence unacceptable to S. S could on the other hand ask the client to identify the projects he works in. If one of them is a partner project of S, access is granted for the client. This would force the client to reveal its association to projects that it may consider to be sensitive. Which one is preferred could hardly be determined without considering the real context of such applications. The example indicates that there may be no conceptually best access policies evaluation strategy for all participants involved. The evaluation proof procedure we are going to present shortly may be an appropriate one in one context and less so in others. But anyway it represents an option that needs to be taken into consideration when a method is designed for access policy evaluation in an application.
The negotiation strategy developed in this paper is biased toward the manager of a resource. In the above example, when getting a access request, the server asks the client for credentials certifying its association to projects he works in. In this way, the server could protect its data but the client may have to expose more sensitive information than it loves to.
There are two kinds of requests that principals may send to each other:
-Original requests that start a negotiation process:
A to B : Bel(B, T W (R), A)
stating intuitively that A (the sender) asks B (the receiver) to check whether A is trustworthy for access to R. -Requests that are sent in response to an earlier request:
stating intuitively that A asks B for certificates certifying that B has attribute T Negotiation results are sent in messages of the following form:
in which A informs B that the negotiation for access to R has succeeded or failed respectively.
During a trust negotiation, the sets of certificates collected by participants change as the principals involved may have to send to the other side a number of certificates. We define a state of a principal B during a negotiation as a pair (sc,ss) where sc represents the set of certificates it has collected so far in his database of certificates and ss represents the set of certificates it has sent to the other side from the start of the current negotiation until now A negotiation is characterized by state change caused by sending and receiving requests. We use the notation (sc, ss)
−→ B (sc , ss )) to denote that when B receives (resp. sends) a request M, B will start its part in a negotiation process to satisfy M and B ends the negotiation when B sends out (resp. receives) message N containing the result of the negotiation. At the end of the negotiation, sc" is the set of credentials B has collected so far and ss" is the set of credentials B has sent over to A. 
Let M be of the form
A to B : Bel(B, T W (R), A)
where R is a resource but not a certificate. A negotiation is initiated when M is sent from A to B. It follows that ss = ss = ∅. When B receives M, B checks its access policy to see whether A is trustworthy for access to R. Formally B constructs a local derivation (to be defined shortly) of the form
where N has the form (sc, ss)
where N has the form 
Then following transition happens
(sc, ss)
where N has the form
We will see later, a successful local derivation (G, sc, ss) 
We introduce now the notion of local derivation. First we define a goal as a disjunction K 1 ∨ . . . ∨ K n where each K i is a conjunction of literals.
Intuitively a local derivation from a goal G wrt B is a sequence of goals whose first element is G. Each step in the derivation corresponds to the application of some inference rule which replaces one of the conjunctions by a goal. In this paper, we use a depth-first strategy by always selecting the leftmost conjunction for expansion. A derivation is successful if one of the conjunction is an empty one.A derivation is failed if the last goal is the empty disjunction 1 . In the following, we give a formal definition of the inference steps involved.
Let B = AP l B , DBO B , DBC B , CA B . Formally, a local derivation wrt B from a goal G is a sequence of pairs (G 0 , st 0 ), . . . , (G n , st n ) where G i are goals, G 0 = G, st i = (sc i , ss i ) are states of B. Each G i in the sequence is obtained from the previous one using an inference rule given below. We employ depth-first search strategy by always selecting the leftmost literal in the leftmost conjunction for expansion.
For the purpose of simple reference, we call an atom of the form Bel(x, T, A) where T ∈ CA B an input atom of B as A is expected to provide a certificate to certify it. 
Definition 4. Let L be the selected atom in G i and suppose that
G i has the form K 1 ∨ . . . ∨ K m , where each K i is a conjunction of literals. Let K 1 = LK 1 2 . (G i+1 , sc i+1 , ss i+1 ) is obtained from (G i , sc i , ss i )
Conclusion and Related Works
We have studied the structure of nonmonotonic access policies and provided a general sufficient condition that guarantees the monotonicity wrt the client submitted credentials. We also have argued that only locally defined policy clauses should be nonmonotonic. The semantics of our policy language is based on the stable semantics of logic programming. We have also given a procedure for trust negotiation within our framework and showed its safety. A weakness of our negotiation procedure is that the negotiation parties do not know whether they have submitted enough credentials for access to a resource until access is granted. This problem could be avoided by sending partially evaluated policies instead of requests for certificates like in [3, 13] . We also do not consider the privacy of local data and policies. In the future works, the procedure should be extended to deal with these problems.
Our work is based and inspired by a large body of works on trust management and negotiation [1, 3, 6, 9, 10] though with the exception of Herberg et all [6] , no author has studied problems related to nonmonotonic access policies.
